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As the international community struggles to come to grips with chilling
modem realities of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
and related technology to both state and non-state actors of concern, govern-
ments worldwide are reminded of the imperative of creating and maintaining
sound and comprehensive regulatory frameworks for controlling trade in
sensitive technologies, both at the national and multilateral levels.
On the domestic front, governments of states possessing such technologies
at significant levels (supplier states) turn naturally to an appraisal of their
domestic frameworks for regulating exports of such technologies in order to
restrain their diversion to uses perceived inimical to international peace and
security. In such a climate of security concerns, the inclination of
policymakers is to conduct a thorough re-examination of the tools at their
disposal to tighten perceived loopholes and inefficiencies in their export
control systems. Their internal analysis will at some point, however,
inevitably address tensions between regulating the private behavior of
exporters for purposes of national security and foreign affairs policy concern,
and the protection of individual civil rights as enshrined in the constitutional
documents and processes particularly of liberal democratic states.
This Comment will examine one element of the regulatory framework of
one such supplier state, the United States, relative to export controls-the end
user or "catch-all" controls established by the Export Administration Regula-
tions' Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI). This examination will
focus on the legal implications of the EPCI's provisions as currently drawn and
applied to U.S. exporters, and will attempt to provide an analysis of the
harmony of those provisions with fundamental principles of U.S. constitutional
law.
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Gary Bertsch, Matthew Borman, and Scott Jones for advice and helpful review of drafts of this
Comment.
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
I. EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT AND EXPORT
ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS
In the U.S. Constitution, Congress is entrusted with the authority to
"regulate Commerce with foreign nations . '.." This authority, traditionally
primarily exercised through the establishment of tariffs and other import
regulations, has taken on renewed modem significance as technological
advances have placed in the stream of international commerce items some
potential uses of which are of significant national security concern to the
United States. Particularly since the end of the Second World War, the
attention of U.S. government officials has turned to the creation and mainte-
nance of a comprehensive legislative and regulatory framework for controlling
the export from the United States of items and technologies which can be used
in the manufacture and maintenance of WMD with the purpose of restricting
the supply of such technologies to suspected WMD development programs in
countries of concern.
In 1979, Congress passed the Export Administration Act (EAA) to replace
the provisions of the earlier 1949 Export Control Act. The purpose of the
EAA was to restrict the export of goods and technology, including nuclear
non-proliferation items, which would make a significant contribution to the
military capacities of nations posing a threat to the United States. Particularly,
the EAA sought to regulate so called "dual-use" items, i.e., those items with
both legitimate civilian and potential military application. The regulation of
such items is an especially sensitive area of any export control regime for the
obvious reason that there are entirely legitimate civilian intended uses for such
goods and technologies, and thus there is an understandable tension flowing
from the desire of government, and even more poignantly the desire of
industry, to craft an export control regime which does not excessively burden
the ordinary flow of these goods in the international market. Thus, the EAA
sought to strike a compromise between the valid interests and concerns of
industry in keeping sufficiently open access to international demand for dual-
use goods and technologies, and concerns over their diversion to uses which
threaten U.S. national security.
The EAA's provisions delegated a degree of discretionary authority to the
executive branch to craft regulations for the implementation of its goals and
policies, and specifically for the implementation of a licensing system for
goods of dual-use character. The resulting Export Administration Regulations
' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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(EAR) of the Department of Commerce established a comprehensive regime
for the licensing of dual use goods to be administered by the department's
Bureau of Export Administration (now the Bureau of Industry and Security
(BIS)). The basic structure of the EAR provisions governing dual-use items
consists of a Commerce Control List (CCL), which provides detailed
specifications for approximately 2400 dual-use items, including equipment,
materials, software, and technology (including data and know-how), the export
of which is likely to require a license from BIS.2 Often, items on the CCL will
require a license only if being exported to a particular country of concern,
although some items, even if directed to a non-sensitive location, will yet
require a license due to the significant risk of diversion to a destination of
concern or because of the inherently sensitive nature of the item itself. The
CCL is updated periodically to decontrol items broadly available in the market
and to target restrictions on those critical technology items of particular
proliferation concern.
Thus, when contemplating the export of a good or technology item, an
individual or business in the United States must first classify the commodity
to be exported by reference to the description of items on the CCL and thereby
determine the commodity's Export Control Classification Number (ECCN).
From there, the individual or entity must examine the country charts included
in Section 738.1 of the EAR and find the country to which its item is destined.
By comparing the item's ECCN to the list of ECCNs corresponding to the
subject country, an exporter can determine whether or not a license must be
first obtained from BIS before the item can in fact be exported. This process,
while time-consuming and complex, does provide a fairly systematic and
predictable method for the classification of items and determination of the
necessity of a license application.
However, due to concerns about the dynamic nature of the development and
demand for dual-use goods and technologies, the EAR also established in
Sections 744.1-744.6 a set of regulations known as the Enhanced Proliferation
Control Initiative (EPCI). The EPCI, rather than being based on a set control
list specifying sensitive items to be monitored by exporters, places its emphasis
on exporters' knowledge of the activities and characteristics of end users, or
final recipients, of their commodity and the uses to which their commodity will
be put once in the hands of its destined recipient, including the potential for
diversion of the export from its stated end uses to uses of WMD proliferation
2 15 C.F.R. § 774 (2003).
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concern. Section 744.6(a)(1) places obligations on U.S. exporters with regard
to their knowledge of such facts and their efforts at acquiring such knowledge.
In pertinent part, the regulations state:
(i) No U.S. person... may, without a license from BIS, export,
reexport, or transfer to or in any country any item where that
person knows that such items:
(A) Will be used in the design, development, production, or
use of nuclear explosive devices in or by a country listed in
Country Group D:2...;
(B) Will be used in the design, development, production, or
use of missiles in or by a country listed in Country Group
D:4...; or
(C) Will be used in the design, development, production,
stockpiling, or use of chemical or biological weapons in or by a
country listed in Country Group D:3 ....
(ii) No U.S. person shall, without a license from BIS, knowingly
support an export, reexport, or transfer that does not have a
license as required by this section. Support means any action,
including financing, transportation, and freight forwarding, by
which a person facilitates an export, reexport, or transfer without
being the actual exporter or reexporter. 3
The regulations continue in the same section to forbid any U.S. person from
"perform[ing] any contract, service, or employment that the U.S. person knows
will directly assist" in the development, production or use of the aforemen-
tioned items in the specified nations of concern. They further define the term
"know" and its derivations in the context of the regulation as
not only positive knowledge that [a] circumstance exists or is
substantially certain to occur, but also an awareness of a high
probability of its existence or future occurrence. Such awareness
is inferred from evidence of the conscious disregard of facts
known to a person and is also inferred from a person's willful
avoidance of facts.4
Id. § 744.6(a)(1)(i), (ii) (2003).
Id. § 772.1 (2003).
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The obvious purpose of the EPCI provisions is to supplement the inherently
limited quality of an enumerated list-based system of regulation with a more
inclusive or "catch-all" normative framework that places positive obligations
upon U.S. exporters to make themselves aware not only of the characteristics
of their particular items and their potential for use in WMD programs, but also
of the particulars of the specific uses to which the items are to be put in their
place of destination and of the likelihood of their diversion by either primary
or secondary parties and potential use in the manufacture of WMD.
The utility of such a regulatory policy is easy to understand. Placing such
obligations upon exporters creates, in effect, an entirely new first line of
defense in elements of the private sector in the war on dual-use goods
proliferation. This argument, of course, is supported by the government's
ever-present scarcity of enforcement resources and the efficiency of having
those in closest connection with sources of information on goods and
technologies, as well as end users, accountable for their negligent use of the
same.
In point of fact, however, the provisions of the EPCI have been used in
prosecutions by the Department of Commerce only very rarely. Within the
standard enforcement procedures of the BIS is a trail of notification and
negotiation with charged exporters that, almost without exception, leads to a
settlement of the case before it is brought before an administrative tribunal.
The initial rendering of a charge under the EPCI is itself a comparative rarity,
with only a handful having been brought in the past decade. Thus, the precise
contours of the EPCI regulations and their application to particular cases,
including their effectiveness in supplementing the basic list-based structure of
the EAR, is largely a matter for speculation.
However, the current national security climate in the United States
following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the continuing war
on terrorism both at home and abroad, as well as heightened international
concern over the spread of WMD to countries posing significant perceived
threats to international peace and security, suggest that expanded use of the
provisions of the EPCI to supplement the EAR's control list procedures for
regulation of U.S. persons' trade in dual-use goods in coming years is a distinct
-possibility. As written, the EPCI has the potential to serve as a useful
instrument in the hands of government regulators frustrated by perceived
loopholes in the CCL system, as well as a means by which to shift a significant
proportion of the burden of regulation of trade in dual-use goods to the
resources of the private sector who, according to innumerable documents
issued by the BIS, are thereby placed under obligation to "know your end
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
user." Thus, an examination of the EPCI' s provisions and their harmony with
settled principles of constitutional law is by no means an exercise in mootness,
as such issues will without doubt be raised by defendants in future administra-
tive actions based thereon. Indeed, the tensions which will be examined
between the national security exigencies of the EPCI and principles of
individual rights protection embodied in the U.S. Constitution are but a subset
of the larger current national debate on these issues in a variety of legislative
and regulatory contexts.
II. ANALOGOUS INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS
5
It should be noted with interest that a number of other states have instituted
regulations establishing end-user export controls of a character comparable to
those in the EPCI. The Belgian government, for example, requires an End-Use
Certificate (EUC) for exports to non-NATO countries, including an explicit
assurance from the importing government that the subject commodities will not
be re-exported without the prior consent of the Belgian government. The
EUCs are delivered directly to the importing country's embassy for verifica-
tion purposes and to minimize the danger of false documentation. Three
months after the export of the commodities, the Belgian government requires
proof of delivery, including details of transit routes and travel plans.
Sweden also has a variety of forms of end-user certification specific to the
particular circumstances involved, including a "tailor-made" end-user
statement issued in cases in which none of the standard forms provided fits.
While Sweden does not refer explicitly to follow-up provisions in its export
5 See generally UK House of Commons Trade and Industry Committee, Minutes of
Evidence, Annex, printed December 2, 1998, available at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.co.uk/pa/cml99798/cmselect/cmtrdind/1 138/8110401.htm. For a review of literature
relevant to the subject of EU export controls, see EUROPEAN UNION AND ARMS EXPORTS 65-67
(Bernard Adams, ed., 1995); Geoffrey Van Orden, European Arms Export Controls, in EUROPE
AND THE CHALLENGE OFPROLIFERATION, Challiot Papers 24 WEU Institute for Security Studies
(Paul Cornish et al. eds., 1996), at 68, available at http://www.iss-en.org; Communication from
the Commission--Challenges Facing the European Defense-Related Industry: A Contribution
for Action at a European Level, COM (96) 0010 final at 14; PAUL CORNISH, THE ARMS TRADE
AND EUROPE 17-19,37-38 (1995); Burkard Schmitt, ACOMMONEUROPEANEXPORTPOuCYFOR
DEFENCE AND DUAL-USE ITEMS?, Occasional Paper 25 WEU Institute for Security Studies
(2001), available at http://www.iss-en.org; and Nathalie Prouvez, Implementation and
Enforcement of an EC Arms and Dual-Use Goods Export Policy, in ARMS AND DUAL-USE
EXPORTS FROM THE EC: A COMMON POLICY FOR REGULATION AND CONTROL (1992).
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licensing, investigations regarding reexport have taken place, with on-site
inspections having been performed in at least one instance.
Perhaps the most analogous example of end-user controls to the U.S. model
is to be found in Germany, where investigations into the violation of German
export control laws in the 1980s led to the institution of a number of reforms
to the legal and administrative structure of end-use controls. A "catch-all"
clause was introduced in 1990 pertinent to exports under the Foreign Trade
Act. Although the catch-all language regulating chemical, biological, and
nuclear weapons, as well as that regulating missile technologies, subsequently
became subject to and subsumed under Article 4 of the European Community's
Regulation on Dual-Use Goods, the catch-all legislative language in relation
to conventional weapons remains in German national law and is a unique
feature of the German export control model. Under this provision, exports of
goods not on a specified Export List (comparable to the CCL) require a license
when destined for use in the production of conventional weapons or armaments
in thirteen listed countries of concern and the exporter has prior knowledge of
this intended use. In effect, this requires companies to exercise comparable
due diligence in confirming that all proposed exports to these destinations are
for legitimate civilian use only.
These supplements to the traditional list-based export control system have
been used extensively internationally as a common consensus has grown
among governments that the dynamic character of both technological
development, particularly in the dual-use area, and evaluations of geopolitical
threats demand more flexible tools in the hands of national regulators to
implement effective export control systems.
I. NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE APPLICATION OF THE EPCI
In the recently published United States National Security Strategy
document, the president states that
[t]he gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of
radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared
that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence
indicates that they are doing so with determination. The United
States will not allow these efforts to succeed . . . We will
GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
cooperate with other nations to deny, contain, and curtail our
enemies' efforts to acquire dangerous technologies.6
The same document includes export controls as among the integral elements
in the president's comprehensive strategy to combat WMD proliferation.
Control of dual-use goods particularly has taken on increased urgency and
importance in the minds of policymakers, following revelations in the late
1990s that much of Iraq's stockpile, particularly of chemical weapons, was
supplied to it prior to the Gulf War by foreign companies in the form of
civilian-use-intended chemical commodities, the sale of which was unimpeded
by loose governmental controls on such dual-use character goods.7 Thus, a
tightening of export controls for dual-use goods has been an issue of increasing
priority for U.S. policymakers, who may soon find in the provisions of the
EPCI a source of regulation already on the books which offers increased
breadth and flexibility to their efforts in this regard.
However, despite their theoretical and practical utilities, the EPCI
provisions, by the same token, exemplify some typical problems always
present when more standardized methods of regulation are supplemented by,
or abandoned and replaced by, broadly drawn positive obligations of due
diligence imposed upon private individuals. Questions which would be raised
in the EPCI context would undoubtedly include these queries: What does it
really mean on the ground for an exporter to, in essence, "know or should have
known" in the context of circumstances indicating an end use in WMD related
programs? How much knowledge and what kinds of facts should be enough
to send up a red flag? How far does an exporter have to go to obtain sufficient
information to exculpate themselves? What about the resource differentiation
between exporters? Are smaller entities under the same due diligence
obligations as large multinational entities? Who gets to decide what the
parameters of inquiry and fact finding must be, and what are the standards for
deciding?
This last query is in fact the most problematic. As written, the EPCI
regulations arguably provide little in the way of standards to guide a Depart-
ment of Commerce lawyer or an administrative law judge in determining
whether a requisite level of due diligence has been exerted in finding out
information on end users and potential uses of an export, as well as what
6 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Sept. 2002, available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssintro.html.
' James Holmes & Gary Bertsch, Tighten Export Controls, DEFENSE NEWS, May 5, 2003.
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knowledge will suffice to trigger the EPCI's application in a particular case.
In fact, the knowledge standard itself in the EPCI regulations is drawn so
broadly that it, in effect, could be argued to cover the same breadth of states
of mind and conditions of awareness which the American Law Institute's
Model Penal Code uses four separate categories to describe. A comparison of
the definitional terminology used for "knowledge" in the EPCI context, and
that used for the categories "purposely," "knowingly," "recklessly," and even
"negligently" in the context of the Model Penal Code, reveals similarities in
each category indicating that the potential breadth of use of the concept of
knowledge in the EPCI context is conceivably as broad as that covered by all
four Model Penal Code categories put together.'
The material problem is that, without clear standards to guide both
regulators and, more importantly, the private subjects of the law, the
regulations are in danger of becoming an arbitrary exercise of enforcement by
government officials given excessive discretion in applying overly-broad
norms, something the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution cannot countenance. As previously mentioned, a significant body
of case law has not yet formed by which to discern standards not present in the
regulations themselves, so at present the observer is left with only the contours
of the regulations as drawn and to speculate about the scope of their potential
application. However, as noted, the time may come and may not be far distant
when the harmony of the EPCI provisions with bedrock principles of due
process jurisprudence will be central to their continued usefulness as tools in
the United States' efforts to combat illicit trade in dual-use goods and the
resulting threat of proliferation of WMD.
IV. DUE PROCESS CONCERNS
There are many cases likely to be brought in the future on the basis of the
EPCIs in which the ambiguity in the knowledge standard, as drawn in the
regulations, will not be a major concern. In many such cases, it will be clear
that there was actual knowledge of salient and dangerous facts of intended or
understood risk of diversion to WMD uses by end users on the part of an
exporter, and willful violation of the EAR's proscriptions on exporting
nevertheless. But, in many imaginable contexts, particularly involving less
sophisticated and smaller resource exporters, the provisions of the EPCI could
,conceivably be applied in a manner that would raise serious concerns of
' MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1985).
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injustice having been done. Personal and/or business liability might be seen
to arise from failure to act on information held, or insufficient efforts expended
to find out facts, in circumstances in which the defendant exporter had little
basis on which to expect that its conduct was in any way contrary to estab-
lished law.
While executive agencies have been honored by the federal courts with a
great deal of deference in both their rulemaking and adjudicatory processes
through such decisions as the landmark Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. case,9 administrative regulations, as sources
of law flowing from duly delegated original grants of authority to Congress
under the U.S. Constitution, are still subject in the final analysis to the
substantive limitations on all lawmaking prescribed in that document. One of
the foremost of these is that no U.S. citizen (or juridical person) is to be
deprived of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."'"
Most pertinently in a consideration of the EPCI regulations, administrative
agencies at the state and federal levels are required by the due process
jurisprudence of the federal courts, as other lawmaking organs, to prescribe
rules which are not excessively vague or standardless. As Supreme Court
Justice William Brennan has explained:
By demanding that government articulate its aims with a reason-
able degree of clarity, the Due Process Clause ensures that state
power will be exercised only on behalf of policies reflecting a
conscious choice among competing social values; reduces the
danger of caprice and discrimination in the administration of the
laws; and permits meaningful judicial review of state actions."
Specifically in the administrative context, the federal courts have fashioned
a doctrine of vagueness which is applied to an administrative regulation to test
it for soundness under the Due Process Clause. In Soglin v. Kaufman the
administration of the University of Wisconsin had expelled a number of
students pursuant to a standard proscribing "misconduct."' 2 At trial, the
9 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
'0 U.S. CONST. amend. V and XIV. Due process with regard to property interests has been
held to attach when, as in the case of the EPCI, the property interest at issue is in the form of a
license and the regulation at issue is a part of a licensing regime. See Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d
605 (5th Cir. 1964); Clark v. City of Fremont, 377 F. Supp. 327 (D. Neb. 1974).
" Whisenhunt v. Spradlin, 464 U.S. 965, 969 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
12 418 F.2d 163, 165 (7th Cir. 1969).
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university's action was overturned on the basis that "misconduct" was too
vague a standard to be a useful rule of conduct. As the Court explained:
No one disputes the power of the University to protect itself by
means of disciplinary actions against disruptive students. Power
to punish and the rules defining the power are not, however,
identical. Power alone does not supply the standards needed to
determine its application to types of behavior or specific in-
stances of "misconduct."'"
Perhaps even more analogous to the EPCI context is the decision of a
federal district court in Clark v. City of Fremont.4 In that case, the court
struck down a city ordinance providing for the revocation and suspension of
retail licenses, in this case a liquor license, on the basis that the grounds for
revocation of the licenses "are based upon words incapable of intelligible or
precise meaning" such that "these provisions subject.. . licensees to possible
arbitrary, and wholly discretionary, administrative decisions as to what
constitutes a ground for revocation," and due to the absence of "ascertainable
standards" within the ordinance by which a licensee could assess their
"contemplated conduct."' 5 Thus, even when regulation is based on the
licensing of privileged, and not rights-based conduct, the strictures of the Due
Process Clause will serve to invalidate a regulation which is drawn vaguely
and without sufficient criteria on which notice may be reasonably obtained by
subjects of the regulation of the parameters of proscribed action or inaction.
In the context of the EPCI, one justification for end-user focused treatment
of export control is the truly dynamic character of technological innovation in
the area of dual-use goods and the near impossibility of providing timely and
relevant updates to the CCL to cover all items of concern. However, the utility
of the EPCI in handling such "fine tuning" issues of dual-use items control
would not seem to present a compelling justification for over-broad adminis-
trative regulation. As explained by Professors Aman and Mayton:
[t]he courts have usually rejected arguments that a discretion to
proceed by ad hoc orders rather than by rules is necessary to
permit an agency to make decisions finely tuned to the facts and
'3 Id. at 167.
" 377 F. Supp. 327, 335 (D. Neb. 1974).
15 Id.
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circumstances of an individual case. As stated by one court, this
interest in fine tuning does not "outweigh the individual's interest
in being protected from arbitrary and capricious decision mak-
ing."' 6
V. NATIONAL SECURITY OVERRIDE?
However, none of the examples of unconstitutional vagueness presented
thus far in the jurisprudence of the federal courts presents the countervailing
claims to national security necessity and the conduct of foreign affairs policy
presented by proponents of the legitimate applicability of the EPCI in the
context of regulation of trade in dual-use goods and technologies. It is true
that, in some cases, federal court jurisprudence has recognized that national
security and foreign affairs concerns can hold sway to legitimize governmental
actions and policies that would otherwise be unconstitutional breaches of
Americans' fundamental individual civil rights. Although now quite infamous,
the 1944 Korematsu decision of the Supreme Court, by which the internment
of thousands of American citizens of Japanese ancestry during the Second
World War was premised on just such a balancing of national security
concerns and individual constitutional protections. In that case, the national
security exigencies perceivedly compelling the deprivation of liberty of
American citizens for an extended period of time carried the day. 7
In a less precedentially suspect, and perhaps more fact-analogous case, the
Court in 1936 upheld the prosecution of the Curtiss-Wright Corporation for
conspiring to sell fifteen machine guns to Bolivia during a period in which an
embargo on the sale of munitions to the country had been put in place by an
executive order of President Roosevelt.' The order had been authorized by a
broadly-drawn joint resolution of Congress, passed in May 1934, empowering
the president to establish the embargo with such limitations and exceptions as
he should deem proper. Here, the property interests of the U.S. corporation to
conduct international business transactions were held to be subject to the
16 ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WLLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW 78 (1992) (quoting
Baker-Chaput v. Cammett, 406 F. Supp. 1134, 1140 (D.N.H. 1976)). The court in Baker-Chaput
further noted that "to require the agency to formulate standards 'will neither force unrealistic
rigidity in the content of these standards nor bring about administrative inefficiency.' " Baker-
Chaput, 406 F. Supp. at 1140 (quoting Hill v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 335 F.2d 355,363 (5th Cir.
1964)).
" Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
IS United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
[Vol. 32:107
2004] THE ENHANCED PROLIFERATION CONTROL INITIATIVE 119
interests of the nation and the power of the president to conduct foreign affairs
policy. A distinct differentiation was made by the Court between the
president's (and one could by extrapolation argue an executive agency's)
powers in conducting purely internal affairs and in conducting the affairs of
the nation in respect of foreign or external affairs. It is highly likely that the
U.S. administration would argue that such a foreign affairs interest, as well as
a national security interest, is decidedly present in the field of export controls
such as to trigger more deference by the courts to discretionary administrative
regulation. In fact, in 1990, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held in United
States v. Mandel that
[t]he EAA requires the Secretary to consider such things as
whether the imposition of export controls would be detrimental
to the foreign policy or national security interests of the United
States, whether restrictions on a given commodity would fulfill
declared international obligations of this country, and whether
the export of a given commodity would make a significant
contribution to the military potential of other countries. These
are quintessentially matters of policy entrusted by the Constitu-
tion to the Congress and the President, for which there are no
meaningful standards of judicial review.'9
Following the Supreme Court's 1965 ruling in Zemel v. Rusk that "because
of the changeable and explosive nature of contemporary international
relations, . ... Congress-in giving the Executive authority over matters of
foreign affairs-must of necessity paint with a brush broader than that it
customarily wields in domestic areas,"' the Ninth Circuit subsequently held
in a pivotal case on the EAA that
[plermitting Congress broadly to delegate decisions about
controlled exports to an agency makes sense; it would be
impossible for Congress to revise the CCL quickly enough to
respond to the fast-paced developments in the foreign policy
arena. Moreover, the need for uniformity in the realm of foreign
'9 914 F.2d 1215, 1223 (9th Cir. 1990). See also United States v. Gurrola-Garcia, 547 F.2d
1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 1976) (emphasizing "the President's traditional dominance in and
responsibility for foreign affairs").
20 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965).
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
policy is particularly acute; it would be politically disastrous if
the Second Circuit permitted the export of computer equipment
and the Ninth Circuit concluded that such exports were not
authorized by the EAA. Because the Supreme Court has
consistently emphasized that broad delegations are appropriate in
the foreign policy arena because of the political nature of the
decisions and the compelling need for uniformity, the case for
mandatory judicial review is even less compelling. 2'
VI. PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS
The context of a U.S. federal agency is, in fact, an amalgam of authority,
with the agencies themselves being located within the executive branch and
answerable to the president, but deriving their authority to regulate from
statutory authority given them by Congress. Thus, an examination of the
claims of both executive and legislative branches to authority in matters of
national security and foreign affairs could be relevant in any judicial review
of the constitutionality of application of the EPCI. The outcome of such a
review might, in fact, hinge on whether the application of the EPCI regulations
was considered to legitimately draw its authority from the EAA, as the
Commerce Department's counsel would allege, or, as defense counsel would
maintain, is so outside the scope of the statutory authority granted to the
Department of Commerce that it must be viewed as an unconstitutional
exercise of legislative power by an administrative official.22
In such a forum, it would surely be pointed out by counsel for a defendant
exporter that there is ample countervailing j urisprudence, establishing the rule
of law and constitutional protections even in times of crisis and issues of
foreign affairs and national security concern. Protection of private property
rights against the power of governmental seizure was upheld by the Supreme
Court's 1952 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer decision.23 At a critical
point in the prosecution of the Korean conflict, a labor impasse in the nation's
steel mills threatened to shut down steel production, potentially seriously
hampering the war effort. In order to preserve steel production, President
Truman signed an executive order transferring control over the steel mills to
21 United States v. Bozarov, 974 F.2d 1037, 1044 (9th Cir. 1992).
22 See id.; Dart v. United States, 848 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S.
184(1958).
1 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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the federal government. The case reached a decision in the Supreme Court two
months later (quite a rapid timetable for a decision of such scale), with the
majority issuing a relatively short, direct opinion holding the seizure order
unconstitutional. The Court, in its majority opinion, examined each claim to
executive power to seize the mills forwarded by the president and found none
to be valid.
More interesting than the majority opinion, however, is the concurring
opinion of Justice Jackson, in which he laid out, in a more comprehensive
fashion, the authority of the president in three hypothetical contexts: the first
when the president acts pursuant to either express or implied authorization of
Congress, the second when the president acts in absence of such authorization,
and the third when the president "takes measures incompatible with the
expressed or implied will of Congress. '24 Justice Jackson reasoned that, as
analysis of executive action progressed from the first to the third contextual
categories, the president's authority to act waned correspondingly. He
concurred with the majority that under the Youngstown facts the president's
action could be "justified only by the severe tests under the third grouping,
where it can be supported only by any remainder of executive power after
subtraction of such powers as Congress may have over the subject. 25
In the case of the EPCI, the EAA does clearly delegate to the executive
branch authority to impose export controls for reasons of national security,
foreign policy, and domestic short supply. 26 Thus, there is certainly a broad
statutory basis for executive action in this area absent an unlikely finding that
the particular characteristics of the EPCI regulations somehow remove its
inclusion within this mandate. At first blush, therefore, executive action in the
area of export controls under the EAA would seem to fall quite squarely under
the first category of Youngstown analysis, in which the president's power to
regulate is at its zenith. However, there are of course substantive limits on the
powers of Congress to make law even in the areas of national security and
foreign affairs policy. For example, the Supreme Court has held that "the
phrase 'war power' cannot be invoked as a talismanic incantation to support
any exercise of congressional power which can be brought within its ambit.
'Even the war power does not remove constitutional limitations safeguarding
individual liberties.' ,27
24 Id. at 637.
25 id. at 640.
26 50 U.S.C. §§ 2402(2), 2402(10) and 2404-06.
27 United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258,264-65 (1967) (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
Most poignantly and on point in the current analysis is another holding of
the Ninth Circuit in the case of Bozarov. There the court held that, while the
EAA expressly excludes judicial review of many agency decisions taken under
its authority, the statute did not fail constitutional muster under the
nondelegation doctrine because two types of judicial review under the EAA
were available. One such category of review includes the aforementioned
determination of "claims that the Secretary acted in excess of his delegated
authority under the EAA. '' 28 The other includes "colorable constitutional
claims. '29 The court in Bozarov went on to consider the merits of the claims
of the defendant that his right to due process had been violated by a number of
means, including importantly the character of the regulation in question as not
giving "fair notice of the forbidden conduct. 30
Although the court in Bozarov found the claims of the defendant on this
point factually meritless, its holding that constitutional claims of violation of
rights to due process can be reached in the specific context of an administrative
prosecution under the EAA, and its actual consideration of such a claim arising
from perceived regulatory vagueness, lend strong persuasive support to the
adoption of a similar policy by other federal circuits and by the Supreme
Court. Thus, vagueness alleged to be present by a defendant exporter in the
context of a prosecution under the EPCI could, if properly placed as an issue
before a federal court, be a successful candidate for judicial disposition, with
the consequent possibility of use as a basis for a ruling of unconstitutionality
of the EPCI's provisions.
VII. IMPLICATIONS
When the constitutional jurisprudence of the federal courts and cases
arguing for its respect even in times of national security crisis are weighed
against the claims of national security and foreign affairs necessity of the
provisions of the EPCI in the regulation of trade in dual-use goods particularly
in light of the current and revolutionary context of threats of nuclear, chemical
and biological weapons of mass destruction both by states and non-state
terrorist actors, it is unclear in what direction an appropriately seized federal
v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934)).
28 United States v. Bozarov, 974 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1992).
29 Id.
30 Id.
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court would rule on an appeal from agency determination brought to it by an
exporter based on the Due Process Clause.
Indeed, as previously mentioned, this juncture of protected rights and
national security concern is still being played out in a number of varying
contexts in the United States today, as all the branches and levels of govern-
ment wrestle with these competing claims of value in the regulation of private
conduct post-September 11. The fate of the EPCI might well be determined
by the jurisprudence which develops from its actual application, and substan-
tive standards which may yet be imposed thereby upon its textual ambit.
However, at present, and as the text of the EPCI regulations are currently
drawn, it must be concluded at least that its constitutionality is subject to some
considerable doubt. This doubt as to substantive legitimacy and enforceability
of the EPCI's provisions of course casts a shadow over its usefulness in
combating transfers of sensitive technologies by U.S. exporters.
It is hoped that this brief treatment of the EPCI regulations and the tensions
presented thereby between national security and foreign affairs exigency and
fundamental guarantees of individual rights under the U.S. Constitution will
primarily aid in the identification of issues of law and policy surrounding these
important interests and their competing claims to primacy in this context. It
is further hoped that this analysis may be of some use to policymakers in
determining the most prudent resolution of this fundamental conflict of values,
whether to the eventual confirmation of overriding policy necessity in favor of
the EPCI's broad application, or rather to the curtailing of regulatory purview
through its substantive amendment or repeal.

